Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2024

Keywords

attorneys; white-collar fraud; criminal sentences; theory of access

Abstract

In the American white-collar fraud prosecution system, attorneys stand between fraudsters and criminal justice. Based on the theory of access literature, this manuscript explores whether attorneys’ selection moderates the relationship between severity of crime and criminal sentence. Collected data from 1,872 white-collar crimes between 2002 and 2020 prosecuted in San Antonio, Texas, test this hypothesis. Findings evidence that attorneys’ selection influences up to 10 percent of the criminal sentence (+,- 64 days). Socioeconomic control variables result in statistical significance, while demographics lack this condition. These findings suggest that fraudsters have incentives to maximize the defrauded amount to gain higher-quality legal access to maintain the ambiguity of the legitimacy of the sources while minimizing criminal sentences if any. A supplementary statistical analysis enhances the reliability of the findings.

Publication Title

Journal of Forensic and Investigative Accounting

Volume

16

Issue

1

Comments

This is the author accepted manuscript of the published article:

Jimenez-Andrade, J. R. (2024). The Visible Hand of Lawyers: Attorney’s Selection, White-Collar Fraud, and Criminal Sentences. Journal of Forensic and Investigative Accounting, 16(1).

Publisher Citation

Jimenez-Andrade, J. R. (2024). The Visible Hand of Lawyers: Attorney’s Selection, White-Collar Fraud, and Criminal Sentences. Journal of Forensic and Investigative Accounting, 16(1).

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